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In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically
connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment
aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the
converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation
(using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an
embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow￿ s
theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although
we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow￿ s theorem, our main aim is to identify the
analogue of Arrow￿ s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between
judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment
aggregation model.
JEL Classi￿cation: D70, D71
1 Introduction
The problem of "judgment aggregation" has recently received much attention:
How can the judgments of several individuals on logically connected propo-
sitions be aggregated into corresponding collective judgments? To illustrate,
suppose a three-member committee has to make collective judgments (accep-
tance/rejection) on three connected propositions:
a: "Carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold x."
a ! b: "If carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold x, then there
will be global warming."
b: "There will be global warming."
a a ! b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: The discursive paradox
1We thank Richard Bradley, Ruvin Gekker, Ron Holzman, Philippe Mongin, Klaus
Nehring, Clemens Puppe and the referees for comments and suggestions. Addresses for cor-
respondence: F. Dietrich, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht,
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands; C. List, Department of Government,
London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, U.K.As shown in Table 1, the ￿rst committee member accepts all three proposi-
tions; the second accepts a but rejects a ! b and b; the third accepts a ! b but
rejects a and b. Then the judgments of each committee member are individually
consistent, and yet the majority judgments on the propositions are inconsistent:
a majority accepts a, a majority accepts a ! b, but a majority rejects b.
This so-called discursive paradox (Pettit 2001) has led to a growing literature
on the possibility of consistent judgment aggregation under various conditions.
List and Pettit (2002) have provided a ￿rst model of judgment aggregation based
on propositional logic and proved that no aggregation rule generating consistent
collective judgments can satisfy some conditions inspired by (but not equivalent
to) Arrow￿ s conditions on preference aggregation. This impossibility result has
been extended and strengthened by Pauly and van Hees (forthcoming; see also
van Hees forthcoming), Dietrich (2006), and G￿rdenfors (forthcoming).2 Ab-
stracting from propositional logic, Dietrich (forthcoming) has provided a model
of judgment aggregation in general logics, which we use in the present paper,
that can represent aggregation problems involving propositions formulated in
richer logical languages. Drawing on the related model of "property spaces",
Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2005) have proved the ￿rst agenda characterization
results, identifying necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which an agenda
of propositions gives rise to an impossibility result under certain conditions.
Although judgment aggregation is di⁄erent from the more familiar problem
of preference aggregation, the recent results resemble earlier results in social
choice theory. The discursive paradox resembles Condorcet￿ s paradox of cyclical
majority preferences, and the various recent impossibility theorems resemble
Arrow￿ s and other theorems on preference aggregation. This raises the question
of how the work on judgment aggregation is related to earlier work in social
choice theory. Provocatively expressed, is it just a reinvention of the wheel?
It can be replied that the logic-based model of judgment aggregation gener-
alizes Arrow￿ s classical model of preference aggregation. Speci￿cally, preference
aggregation problems can be modelled as special cases of judgment aggregation
problems by representing preference orderings as sets of binary ranking judg-
ments in predicate logic (List and Pettit 2001/2004; List 2003).3 Less formally,
this way of thinking about preferences goes back to Condorcet himself (see also
Guilbaud 1966).
In this paper, we reinforce this argument. After introducing the judgment
aggregation model in general logics and proving two impossibility results (us-
ing "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct
2Possibility results, obtained by relaxing some of the conditions of these impossibility re-
sults, have been proved by List (2003, 2004); Dietrich (2006), Pigozzi (forthcoming), and
Dietrich and List (2005). The relationship with the Condorcet jury theorem has been inves-
tigated by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and List (2005).
3This embedding works only for the ordinal preference-relation-based part of Arrowian
social choice theory, not for the cardinal welfare-function-based part. Wilson￿ s (1975) aggre-
gation model, as discussed in our concluding remarks, is another generalization of ordinal
preference aggregation.
2an explicit embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and
prove Arrow￿ s theorem (for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second im-
possibility result. We also point out that our ￿rst impossibility result has corol-
laries for the aggregation of other binary relations (such as partial orderings or
equivalence relations).
Although we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow￿ s theorem, our primary
aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow￿ s theorem in judgment aggregation, to
clarify the logical relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and
to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
Related results were given by List and Pettit (2001/2004), who derived a
simple impossibility theorem on preference aggregation from their (2002) im-
possibility result on judgment aggregation, and Nehring (2003), who derived
an Arrow-like impossibility theorem from Nehring and Puppe￿ s (2002) charac-
terization result in the related model of "property spaces". But neither result
exactly matches Arrow￿ s theorem. Compared to Arrow￿ s original theorem, List
and Pettit￿ s result requires additional neutrality and anonymity conditions, but
no Pareto principle; Nehring￿ s result requires an additional monotonicity con-
dition. We highlight the connections of our present results with these and other
results (including recent results by Dokow and Holzman 2005) throughout the
paper.
2 The judgment aggregation model
We consider a group of individuals 1;2;:::;n (n ￿ 2). The group has to make
collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
Formal logic. Propositions are represented in an appropriate logic. A logic
(with negation symbol :) is an ordered pair (L; ￿), where (i) L is a non-empty
set of formal expressions (propositions) closed under negation (i.e., if p 2 L
then :p 2 L), and (ii) ￿ is an entailment relation, where, for each set A ￿ L
and each proposition p 2 L, A ￿ p is read as "A entails p" (we write p ￿ q to
abbreviate fpg ￿ q).4
A set A ￿ L is inconsistent if A ￿ p and A ￿ :p for some p 2 L, and
consistent otherwise; A ￿ L is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent and
every proper subset B ( A is consistent. A proposition p 2 L is contingent if
fpg and f:pg are consistent.
We require the logic to satisfy the following minimal conditions:
(L1) For all p 2 L, p ￿ p (self-entailment).
(L2) For all p 2 L and A ￿ B ￿ L, if A ￿ p then B ￿ p (monotonicity).
(L3) ; is consistent, and each consistent set A ￿ L has a consistent superset
B ￿ L containing a member of each pair p;:p 2 L (completability).
4Formally, ￿￿ P(L) ￿ L, where P(L) is the power set of L.
3Many di⁄erent logics satisfy conditions L1 to L3, including standard propo-
sitional logic, standard modal and conditional logics and, for the purpose of
representing preferences, predicate logic, as de￿ned below. For example, in
standard propositional logic, L contains propositions such as a; b, a ^ b, a _ b,
a ! b, :(a ^ b), and ￿ satis￿es fa;a ! bg ￿ b, b ￿ a _ b, but not b ￿ a ^ b.
The agenda. The agenda is a non-empty subset X ￿ L, interpreted as the
set of propositions on which judgments are to be made, where X is a union
of proposition-negation pairs fp;:pg (with p not itself a negated proposition).
For simplicity, we assume that double negations cancel each other out, i.e.,
::p stands for p.5 In the discursive paradox example above, the agenda is
X = fa;:a;b;:b;a ! b;:(a ! b)g, with ! interpreted either as the material
conditional in standard propositional logic or as a subjunctive conditional in a
suitable conditional logic.
Agenda richness. Whether or not judgment aggregation gives rise to serious
impossibility results depends on how the propositions in the agenda are inter-
connected. We consider agendas X with di⁄erent types of interconnections.
Our basic agenda assumption, which signi￿cantly generalizes the one in List
and Pettit (2002), is minimal connectedness. An agenda X is minimally con-
nected if (i) it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y ￿ X with jY j ￿ 3, and (ii)
it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y ￿ X such that (Y nZ) [ f:z : z 2 Zg is
consistent for some subset Z ￿ Y of even size.6
As Ron Holzman has indicated to us, part (ii) of minimal connectness is
equivalent to Dokow and Holzman￿ s (2005) assumption that the set of admissible
yes/no views on the propositions in X is a non-a¢ ne subset of f0;1gX.7
To obtain a more demanding agenda assumption, we de￿ne
path-connectedness, a variant of Nehring and Puppe￿ s (2002) assumption of
total blockedness.8 For any p;q 2 X, we write p ￿￿ q if fp;:qg [ Y is incon-
sistent for some Y ￿ X consistent with p and with :q.9 Now an agenda X is
path-connected if, for every contingent p;q 2 X, there exist p1;p2;:::;pk 2 X
(with p = p1 and q = pk) such that p1 ￿￿ p2, p2 ￿￿ p3, ..., pk￿1 ￿￿ pk.
The agenda of our example above is minimally connected, but not path-
connected. As detailed below, preference aggregation problems can be repre-
sented by agendas that are both minimally connected and path-connected. The
5When we use the negation symbol : hereafter, we mean a modi￿ed negation symbol
￿, where ￿ p := :p if p is unnegated and ￿ p := q if p = :q for some q.
6Note that the set Y can be di⁄erent in parts (i) and (ii).
7In the ￿rst version of this paper, we had used a more restrictive version of part (ii),
requiring Z to be of size two rather than even size. The present version of part (ii) was
introduced in Dietrich (forthcoming).
8For a compact logic, path-connectedness is equivalent to total blockedness; in the general
case, path-connectedness is weaker.
9For non-paraconsistent logics (in the sense of L4 in Dietrich forthcoming), fp;:qg[Y is
inconsistent if and only if fpg [ Y ￿ q.
4aggregation of many other binary relations can be represented by minimally
connected agendas.
Individual judgment sets. Each individual i￿ s judgment set is a subset Ai ￿
X, where p 2 Ai means that individual i accepts proposition p. A judgment set
Ai is consistent if it is a consistent set as de￿ned above; Ai is complete if, for
every proposition p 2 X, p 2 Ai or :p 2 Ai. A pro￿le (of individual judgment
sets) is an n-tuple (A1;:::;An).
Aggregation rules. A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that as-
signs to each admissible pro￿le (A1;:::;An) a single collective judgment set
F(A1;:::;An) = A ￿ X, where p 2 A means that the group accepts propo-
sition p. The set of admissible pro￿les is called the domain of F, denoted
Domain(F). Examples of aggregation rules are the following.
￿ Propositionwise majority voting. For each (A1;:::;An), F(A1;:::;An)
= fp 2 X : more individuals i have p 2 Ai than p = 2 Aig.
￿ Dictatorship of individual i: For each (A1;:::;An), F(A1;:::;An) = Ai.
￿ Inverse dictatorship of individual i: For each (A1;:::;An), F(A1;:::;An)
= f:p : p 2 Aig.
Regularity conditions on aggregation rules. We impose the following condi-
tions on the inputs and outputs of aggregation rules.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all possible pro￿les of
consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Collective rationality. F generates consistent and complete collective judg-
ment sets.
Propositionwise majority voting, dictatorships and inverse dictatorships sat-
isfy universal domain, but only dictatorships generally satisfy collective ratio-
nality. As the discursive paradox example of Table 1 shows, propositionwise
majority voting sometimes generates inconsistent collective judgment sets. In-
verse dictatorships satisfy collective rationality only in special cases (i.e., when
the agenda is symmetrical: for every consistent Z ￿ X, f:p : p 2 Zg is also
consistent).
3 Two impossibility theorems on judgment
aggregation
Are there any non-dictatorial judgment aggregation rules satisfying universal
domain and collective rationality? The following conditions are frequently used
in the literature.
5Independence. For any proposition p 2 X and pro￿les (A1;:::;An); (A￿
1;:::;
A￿
n) 2 Domain(F), if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only if p 2 A￿
i] then
[p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if and only if p 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n)].
Systematicity. For any propositions p;q 2 X and pro￿les (A1;:::;An);
(A￿
1;:::; A￿
n) 2 Domain(F), if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only if
q 2 A￿
i] then [p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if and only if q 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n)].
Unanimity principle. For any pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) and any
proposition p 2 X, if p 2 Ai for all individuals i, then p 2 F(A1;:::;An).
Independence requires that the collective judgment on each proposition
should depend only on individual judgments on that proposition. Systematic-
ity strengthens independence by requiring in addition that the same pattern of
dependence should hold for all propositions (a neutrality condition). The una-
nimity principle requires that if all individuals accept a proposition then this
proposition should also be collectively accepted. The following result holds.
Proposition 1. For a minimally connected agenda X, an aggregation rule F
satis￿es universal domain, collective rationality, systematicity and the unanim-
ity principle if and only if it is a dictatorship of some individual.
Proof. All proofs are given in the appendix. ￿
Proposition 1 is related to an earlier result by Dietrich (forthcoming), which
requires an additional assumption on the agenda X but no unanimity principle
(the additional assumption is that X is also asymmetrical: for some inconsistent
Z ￿ X, f:p : p 2 Zg is consistent). This result, in turn, generalizes an earlier
result on systematicity by Pauly and van Hees (forthcoming).
From Proposition 1, we can derive two new results of interest. The ￿rst is a
generalization of List and Pettit￿ s (2002) theorem on the non-existence of an ag-
gregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, systematicity
and anonymity (i.e., invariance of the collective judgment set under permuta-
tions of the given pro￿le of individual judgment sets). Our result extends the
earlier impossibility result to any minimally connected agenda and weakens
anonymity to the requirement that there is no dictator or inverse dictator.
Theorem 1. For a minimally connected agenda X, every aggregation rule F
satisfying universal domain, collective rationality and systematicity is a (possi-
bly inverse) dictatorship of some individual.
The agenda assumption of Theorem 1 cannot be weakened further if the
agenda is ￿nite or the logic is compact (and n ￿ 3 and X contains at least one
contingent proposition), i.e., minimal connectedness is also necessary (and not
6just su¢ cient) for giving rise to (possibly inverse) dictatorships by the conditions
of Theorem 1.10
The second result we can derive from Proposition 1 is the analogue of Arrow￿ s
theorem in judgment aggregation, from which we subsequently derive Arrow￿ s
theorem on (strict) preference aggregation as a corollary. We use the following
lemma, which strengthens an earlier lemma by Nehring and Puppe (2002) by
not requiring monotonicity.
Lemma 1. For a path-connected agenda X, an aggregation rule F satisfy-
ing universal domain, collective rationality, independence and the unanimity
principle also satis￿es systematicity.
Let us call an agenda strongly connected if it is both minimally connected
and path-connected. Using Lemma 1, Proposition 1 now implies the following
impossibility result.
Theorem 2. For a strongly connected agenda X, an aggregation rule F sat-
is￿es universal domain, collective rationality, independence and the unanimity
principle if and only if it is a dictatorship of some individual.
Dokow and Holzman (2005) have independently shown that (for a ￿nite
agenda containing only contingent propositions) strong connectedness (in the
form of the conjunction of non-a¢ neness and total blockedness) is both neces-
sary and su¢ cient for characterizing dictatorships by the conditions of Theorem
2 (assuming n ￿ 3). A prior closely related result is Nehring and Puppe￿ s (2002)
characterization result, using total blockeness alone but imposing an additional
monotonicity condition. In fact, within the general logics framework, the ne-
cessity holds if the agenda is ￿nite or the logic is compact (and X contains at
least one contingent proposition; again assuming n ￿ 3).
Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2 continue to hold under generalized
de￿nitions of minimally connected and strongly connected agendas.11
Of course, it is debatable whether and when independence or systematicity
are plausible requirements on judgment aggregation. The literature contains
10It can then be shown that, if X is not minimally connected, there exists an aggregation
rule that satis￿es universal domain, collective rationality and systematicity and is not a
(possibly inverse) dictatorship. Let M be a subset of f1;:::;ng of odd size at least 3. If part
(i) of minimal connectedness is violated, then majority voting among the individuals in M
satis￿es all requirements. If part (ii) is violated, the aggregation rule F with universal domain
de￿ned by F(A1;:::;An) := fp 2 X : the number of individuals i 2 M with p 2 Ai is oddg
satis￿es all requirements. The second example is inspired by Dokow and Holzman (2005).
11In the de￿nition of minimal connectedness, (i) can be weakened to the following: (i*) there
is an inconsistent set Y ￿ X with pairwise disjoint subsets Z1;Z2;Z3 such that (Y nZj) [
f:p : p 2 Zjg is consistent for any j 2 f1;2;3g (Dietrich forthcoming). In the de￿nition
of strong connectedness (by (i), (ii) and path-connectedness), (i) can be dropped altogether,
as path-connectedness implies (i*). In the de￿nitions of minimal connectedness and strong
connectedness, (ii) can be weakened to (ii*) in Dietrich (forthcoming).
7extensive discussions of these conditions and their possible relaxations. In our
view, the importance of Theorems 1 and 2 lies not so much in establishing the
impossibility of consistent judgment aggregation, but rather in indicating what
conditions must be relaxed in order to make consistent judgment aggregation
possible. The theorems describe boundaries of the logical space of possibilities.
4 Arrow￿ s theorem
We now show that Arrow￿ s theorem (stated here for strict preferences) can be
restated in the judgment aggregation model, where it is a direct corollary of
Theorem 2. We consider a standard Arrowian preference aggregation model,
where each individual has a strict preference ordering (asymmtrical, transitive
and connected, as de￿ned below) over a set of options K = fx;y;z;:::g with
jKj ￿ 3. We embed this model into our judgment aggregation model by rep-
resenting preference orderings as sets of binary ranking judgments in a simple
predicate logic, following List and Pettit (2001/2004). Although we consider
strict preferences for simplicity, we note that a similar embedding is possible
for weak preferences.12
A simple predicate logic for representing preferences. We consider a predi-
cate logic with constants x;y;z;::: 2 K (representing the options), variables v,
w, v1, v2 , ..., identity symbol =, a two-place predicate P (representing strict
preference), logical connectives : (not), ^ (and), _ (or), ! (if-then), and uni-
versal quanti￿er 8. Formally, L is the smallest set such that
￿ L contains all propositions of the forms ￿P￿ and ￿ = ￿, where ￿ and
￿ are constants or variables, and
￿ whenever L contains two propositions p and q, then L also contains
:p, (p ^ q), (p _ q), (p ! q) and (8v)p, where v is any variable.
Notationally, we drop brackets when there is no ambiguity. The entailment
relation ￿ is de￿ned as follows. For any set A ￿ L and any proposition p 2 L,
A ￿ p if and only if
A [ Z entails p in the standard
sense of predicate logic,
where Z is the set of rationality conditions on strict preferences:
(8v1)(8v2)(v1Pv2 ! :v2Pv1) (asymmetry);
(8v1)(8v2)(8v3)((v1Pv2 ^ v2Pv3) ! v1Pv3) (transitivity);
(8v1)(8v2)(:v1=v2 ! (v1Pv2 _ v2Pv1)) (connectedness).13
12If we represent weak preference aggregation in the judgment aggregation model using the
embedding indicated below, the independence condition and the unanimity principle become
stronger than Arrow￿ s independence of irrelevant alternatives and the weak Pareto principle.
So, in the case of weak preferences unlike that of strict ones, Theorem 2 only implies a slightly
weaker form of Arrow￿ s theorem.
13For technical reasons, Z also contains, for each pair of distinct constants x;y, the condition
:x=y, re￿ ecting the mutual exclusiveness of the options.
8To represent weak preferences rather than strict ones, Z simply needs to be
rede￿ned as the set of rationality conditions on weak preferences (i.e., re￿ exiv-
ity, transitivity, and connectedness); see also Dietrich (forthcoming).14 Binary
relations with other properties can be represented analogously, by de￿ning Z
as the set of appropriate rationality conditions, e.g., the set containing re￿ ex-
ivity (respectively, asymmetry) and transitivity for weak (respectively, strict)
partial orderings, and the set containing re￿ exivity, transitivity and symmetry
for equivalence relations.
The agenda. The preference agenda is the set X of all propositions of the
forms xPy;:xPy 2 L, where x and y are distinct constants.15 Note the fol-
lowing lemma (which holds for strict as well as weak preferences). The path-
connectedness part of the result is equivalent to a lemma by Nehring (2003).
Lemma 2. The preference agenda X is strongly connected.
The correspondence between preference orderings and judgment sets. It is
easy to see that each (asymmetrical, transitive and connected) preference order-
ing over K can be represented by a unique consistent and complete judgment
set in X and vice-versa, where individual i strictly prefers x to y if and only if
xPy 2 Ai. For example, if individual i strictly prefers x to y to z, this is uniquely
represented by the judgment set Ai = fxPy;yPz;xPz;:yPx;:zPy;:zPxg.
The correspondence between Arrow￿ s conditions and conditions on judgment
aggregation. For the preference agenda, the conditions of universal domain,
collective rationality, independence ("independence of irrelevant alternatives")
and the unanimity principle ("the weak Pareto principle"), as stated above,
exactly match the standard conditions of Arrow￿ s theorem, where an Arrowian
preference aggregation rule is represented by a judgment aggregation rule.
As the preference agenda is strongly connected, Arrow￿ s theorem now follows
from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. (Arrow￿ s theorem) For the preference agenda X, an aggregation
rule F satis￿es universal domain, collective rationality, independence and the
unanimity principle if and only if it is a dictatorship of some individual.
14Transitivity and connectedness are as de￿ned above. Re￿ exivity can be stated by the
proposition (8v)(vPv). For aesthetic reasons, one might also replace the predicate symbol P
by R in the logic.
15xPy is interpreted as "x is better than/preferable to y". Note that this represents pref-
erence aggregation as the aggregation of beliefs of betterness/preferability. One might argue
that preferences are desire-like rather than belief-like and thus object to re-interpreting them
as beliefs of preferability. To respond to this objection, we might, for example, interpret xPy
as "x is socially preferred to y", and interpret an individual judgment set Ai ￿ X as the set
of propositions that individual i desires (rather than believes), while interpreting a collective
judgment set A ￿ X as a set of propositions about social preference.
9Corollary 1 strengthens Nehring￿ s (2003) corollary by dropping monotonic-
ity; it also strengthens List and Pettit￿ s (2001/2004) corollary by weakening
systematicity to independence and (e⁄ectively) anonymity to non-dictatorship,
at the expense of imposing, in addition, the unanimity principle.
The correspondence between preference and judgment aggregation concepts
under the constructed embedding is summarized in Table 2.
Preference aggregation Judgment aggregation
Preference ordering
over a set of options
Judgment set
in the preference agenda
Three or more options
Strong connectedness
of the preference agenda
Asymmetry, transitivity
and connectedness
of the preference ordering
Consistency
and completeness
of the judgment set
Preference aggregation rule Judgment aggregation rule
Universal domain Universal domain
Collective rationality Collective rationality
Independence
of irrelevant alternatives Independence
Weak Pareto principle Unanimity principle
Arrowian dictator (Judgment) dictator
Arrow￿ s theorem Corollary of Theorem 2
Table 2: The embedding of concepts
5 Concluding remarks
After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation ￿Theorem
1 with systematicity and a weak agenda assumption, Theorem 2 with indepen-
dence and a stronger agenda assumption ￿we have shown that Arrow￿ s theorem
(for strict preferences) is a corollary of Theorem 2, applied to the aggregation
of binary ranking judgments in a simple predicate logic. In the case of binary
relations other than preference orderings, Theorem 2 does not necessarily apply,
as the resulting agenda is not necessarily path-connected. For example, if the
binary relations in question are partial orderings or equivalence relations (as
brie￿ y mentioned above), the agenda is merely minimally connected; but The-
orem 2 still yields an immediate corollary for the aggregation of pro￿les of such
binary relations into corresponding collective binary relations: here every aggre-
gation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality and systematicity
is a (possibly inverse) dictatorship of some individual.
These ￿ndings illustrate the generality of judgment aggregation. Impossibil-
ity and possibility results such as Theorems 1 and 2 can apply to a large class
10of aggregation problems formulated in a suitable logic ￿any logic satisfying
conditions L1 to L3 ￿of which a predicate logic for representing preferences is
a special case. Other logics to which the results apply are propositional, modal
or conditional logics, some fuzzy logics as well as di⁄erent predicate logics.
An alternative, very general model of aggregation is the one introduced by
Wilson (1975) and used by Dokow and Holzman (2005), where a group has
to determine its yes/no views on several issues based on the group members￿
views on these issues (subject to feasibility constraints). Wilson￿ s model can
also be represented in our model; Dokow and Holzman￿ s results for Wilson￿ s
model apply to a logic satisfying L1 to L3 and a ￿nite agenda.16
Although we have constructed an explicit embedding of preference aggre-
gation into judgment aggregation, we have not proved the impossibility of a
converse embedding. We suspect that such an embedding is hard to achieve, as
Arrow￿ s standard model cannot easily capture the di⁄erent informational basis
of judgment aggregation. It is unclear what an embedding of judgment aggrega-
tion into preference aggregation would look like. In particular, it is unclear how
to specify the options over which individuals have preferences. The propositions
in an agenda are not candidates for options, as propositions are usually not mu-
tually exclusive. Natural candidates for options are perhaps entire judgment sets
(consistent and complete), as these are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. But
in a preference aggregation model with options thus de￿ned, individuals would
feed into the aggregation rule not a single judgment set (option), but an entire
preference ordering over all possible judgment sets (options). This would be a
di⁄erent informational basis from the one in judgment aggregation. In addition,
the explicit logical structure within each judgment set would be lost under this
approach, as judgment sets in their entirety, not propositions, would be taken
as primitives. However, the construction of a useful converse embedding or the
proof of its non-existence remains a challenge.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let X be minimally connected and let F be any ag-
gregation rule. Put N := f1;:::;ng. If F is dictatorial, F obviously satis-
￿es universal domain, collective rationality, systematicity and the unanimity
principle. Now assume F satis￿es the latter conditions. Then there is a set
12C of ("winning") coalitions C ￿ N such that, for every p 2 X and every
(A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X : fi : p 2 Aig 2 Cg. For
every consistent set Z ￿ X; let AZ be some consistent and complete judgment
set such that Z ￿ AZ.
Claim 1. N 2 C, and, for every coalition C ￿ N, C 2 C if and only if
NnC = 2 C.
The ￿rst part of the claim follows from the unanimity principle, and the
second part follows from collective rationality together with universal domain.
Claim 2. For any coalitions C;C￿ ￿ N; if C 2 C and C ￿ C￿ then C￿ 2 C.
Let C;C￿ ￿ N with C 2 C and C ￿ C￿. Assume for contradiction that
C￿ = 2 C. Then NnC￿ 2 C. Let Y be as in part (ii) of the de￿nition of minimally
connected agendas, and let Z be a smallest subset of Y such that (Y nZ)[f:z :
z 2 Zg is consistent and Z has even size. We have Z 6= ;; since otherwise the
(inconsistent) set Y would equal the (consistent) set (Y nZ) [ f:z : z 2 Zg.
So, as Z has even size, there are two distinct propositions p;q 2 Z. Since Y is
minimal inconsistent, (Y nfpg)[f:pg and (Y nfqg)[f:qg are each consistent.
This and the consistency of (Y nZ) [ f:z : z 2 Zg allow us to de￿ne a pro￿le
(A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) as follows. Putting C1 := C￿nC and C2 := NnC￿





A(Y nfpg)[f:pg if i 2 C
A(Y nZ)[f:z:z2Zg if i 2 C1












Figure 1: The pro￿les constructed in the proofs of claims 2 (left) and 3 (right).
By (1), we have Y nZ ￿ F(A1;:::;An) as N 2 C. Also by (1); we have q 2
F(A1;:::;An) as C 2 C, and p 2 F(A1;:::;An) as C2 = NnC￿ 2 C. In summary,
writing Z￿ := Znfp;qg, we have (*) Y nZ￿ ￿ F(A;:::;An): We distinguish two
cases.
Case C1 = 2 C. Then C [ C2 = NnC1 2 C. So Z￿ ￿ F(A1;:::;An) by (1),
which together with (*) implies Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An). But then F(A1;:::;An) is
inconsistent, a contradiction.
Case C1 2 C. So f:z : z 2 Z￿g ￿ F(A1;:::;An) by (1). This together with
(*) implies that (Y nZ￿) [ f:z : z 2 Z￿g ￿ F(A1;:::;An). So (Y nZ￿) [ f:z :
13z 2 Z￿g is consistent. As Z￿ also has even size, the minimality condition in the
de￿nition of Z is violated.
Claim 3. For any coalitions C;C￿ ￿ N; if C;C￿ 2 C then C \ C￿ 2 C.
Consider any C;C￿ 2 C. Let Y ￿ X be as in part (i) of the de￿nition of min-
imally connected agendas. As jY j ￿ 3, there are pairwise distinct propositions
p;q;r 2 Y . As Y is minimally inconsistent, each of the sets (Y nfpg) [ f:pg,
(Y nfqg) [ f:qg and (Y nfrg) [ f:rg is consistent. This allows us to de￿ned a
pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) as follows. Putting C0 := C\C￿, C1 := C￿nC





A(Y nfpg)[f:pg if i 2 C0
A(Y nfrg)[f:rg if i 2 C1
A(Y nfqg)[f:qg if i 2 C2.
(2)
By (2); Y nfp;q;rg ￿ F(A1;:::;An) as N 2 C. Again by (2), we have q 2
F(A1;:::;An) as C0[C1 = C￿ 2 C. As C 2 C and C ￿ C0[C2, we have C0[C2 2
C by claim 2. So, by (2); r 2 F(A1;:::;An). In summary, Y nfpg ￿ F(A1;:::;An):
As Y is inconsistent, p = 2 F(A1;:::;An); and hence :p 2 F(A1;:::;An): So, by
(2), C0 2 C.
Claim 4. There is a dictator.
Consider the intersection of all winning coalitions, e C := \C2CC: By claim
3, e C 2 C. So e C 6= ;, as by claim 1 ; = 2 C. Hence there is a j 2 e C: As j belongs
to every winning coalition C 2 C, j is a dictator: indeed, for each pro￿le
(A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) and each p 2 X, if p 2 Aj then fi : p 2 Aig 2 C, so
that p 2 F(A1;:::;An); and if p = 2 Ai then :p 2 Ai, so that fi : :p 2 Aig 2 C,
implying :p 2 F(A1;:::;An), and hence p = 2 F(A1;:::;An). ￿
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X be minimally connected, and let F satisfy
universal domain, collective rationality and systematicity. If F satis￿es the
unanimity principle, then, by Proposition 1, F is dictatorial. Now suppose F
violates the unanimity principle.
Claim 1. X is symmetrical, i.e., if A ￿ X is consistent, so is f:p : p 2 Ag.
Let A ￿ X be consistent. Then there exists a consistent and complete
judgment set B such that A ￿ B. As F violates the unanimity principle (but
satis￿es systematicity), the set F(B;:::;B) contains no element of B, hence con-
tains no element of A, hence contains all elements of f:p : p 2 Ag by collective
rationality. So, again by collective rationality, f:p : p 2 Ag is consistent.
Claim 2. The aggregation rule b F with universal domain de￿ned by
b F(A1;:::;An) := f:p : p 2 F(A1;:::;An)g is dictatorial.
As F satis￿es collective rationality and systematicity, so does b F, where the
consistency of collective judgment sets follows from claim 1. b F also satis￿es
the unanimity principle: for any p 2 X and any (A1;:::;An) in the universal
domain, where p 2 Ai for all i, p = 2 F(A1;:::;An), hence :p 2 F(A1;:::;An),
and so p = ::p 2 b F(A1;:::;An). Now Proposition 1 applies to b F, and hence b F
is dictatorial.
14Claim 3. F is inverse dictatorial.
The dictator for b F is an inverse dictator for F. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Let X and F be as speci￿ed. To show that F is system-
atic, consider any p;q 2 X and any (A1;:::;An);(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n) 2 Domain(F) such
that C := fi : p 2 Aig = fi : q 2 A￿
ig, and let us prove that p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if
and only if q 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n). If p and q are both tautologies (f:pg and f:qg are
inconsistent), the latter holds since (by collective rationality) p 2 F(A1;:::;An)
and q 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n). If p and q are both contradictions (fpg and fqg are
inconsistent), it holds since (by collective rationality) p = 2 F(A1;:::;An) and
q = 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n). It is impossible that one of p and q is a tautology and the
other a contradiction, because then one of fi : p 2 Aig and fi : q 2 A￿
ig would
be N and the other ;.
Now consider the remaining case where both p and q are contingent. We
say that C is winning for r (2 X) if r 2 F(B1;:::;Bn) for some (hence by
independence any) pro￿le (B1;::;Bn) 2 Domain(F): with fi : r 2 Big = C.
We have to show that C is winning for p if and only if C is winning for q.
Suppose C is winning for p, and let us show that C is winning for q (the
converse implication can be shown analogously). As X is path-connected and
p and q are contingent, there are p = p1;p2;:::;pk = q 2 X such that p1 ￿￿ p2,
p2 ￿￿ p3, ..., pk￿1 ￿￿ pk. We show by induction that C is winning for each of
p1;p2;:::;pk. If j = 1 then C is winning for p1 by p1 = p. Now let 1 ￿ j < k
and assume C is winning for pj. We show that C is winning for pj+1. By
pj ￿￿ pj+1, there is a set Y ￿ X such that (i) fpjg [ Y and f:pj+1g [ Y are
each consistent, and (ii) fpj;:pj+1g [ Y is inconsistent. Using (i) and (ii), the
sets fpj;pj+1g [ Y and f:pj;:pj+1g [ Y are each consistent. So there exists a
pro￿le (B1;:::;Bn) 2 Domain(F) such that fpj;pj+1g[Y ￿ Bi for all i 2 C and
f:pj;:pj+1g [ Y ￿ Bi for all i = 2 C. Since Y ￿ Ai for all i, Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An)
by the unanimity principle. Since fi : pj 2 Aig = C is winning for pj, we
have pj 2 F(A1;:::;An). So fpjg [ Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An). Hence, using collective
rationality and (ii), we have :pj+1 = 2 F(A1;:::;An), and so pj+1 2 F(A1;:::;An).
Hence, as fi : pj+1 2 Aig = C, C is winning for pj+1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Let X be the preference agenda. X is minimally con-
nected, as, for any pairwise distinct constants x;y;z, the set Y =
fxPy;yPz;zPxg ￿ X is minimal inconsistent, where f:xPy;:yPz;zPxg is
consistent.
To prove path-connectedness, note that, by the axioms of our predicate logic
for representing preferences, (*) :xPy and yPx are equivalent (i.e., entail each
other) for any distinct x;y 2 K. Now consider any (contingent) p;q 2 X, and let
us construct a sequence p = p1;p2;:::;pk = q 2 X with p j=￿ p2;:::;pk￿1 j=￿ q.
By (*), if p is a negated proposition :xPy, then p is equivalent to the non-
negated proposition yPx ; and similarly for q. So we may assume without loss
of generality that p and q are non-negated propositions, say p is xPy and q is
x0Py0. We distinguish three cases, each with subcases.
15Case x = x0. If y = y0, then xPy ￿￿ xPy = x0Py0 (take Y = ;). If y 6= y0,
then xPy ￿￿ xPy0 = x0Py0 (take Y = fyPy0g).
Case x = y0. If y = x0, then, taking any z 2 Knfx;yg, we have xPy ￿￿ xPz
(take Y = fyPzg), xPz ￿￿ yPz (take yPx), and yPz ￿￿ yPx = x0Py0 (take
Y = fzPxg). If y 6= x0, then xPy ￿￿ x0Py (take Y = fx0Pxg) and x0Py ￿￿
x0Py0 (take Y = fyPy0g).
Case x 6= x0;y0. If y = x0, then xPy ￿￿ xPy0 (take Y = fyPy0g) and
xPy0 ￿￿ x0Py0 (take Y = fx0Pxg). If y = y0, then xPy ￿￿ x0Py = x0Py0 (take
Y = fx0Pxg). If y 6= x0;y0, then xPy ￿￿ x0Py0 (take Y = fx0Px;yPy0g). ￿
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